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Appellant Accusearch, Inc.’s Corporate Disclosure Statement 
 
 In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, Appellant Accusearch, Inc. by and 
through its counsel, Gay Woodhouse and Deborah L. Roden of Gay Woodhouse 
Law Office, P.C. hereby submits its corporate disclosure statement and states as 
follows: 
 Accusearch, Inc. does not have a parent corporation and there is no publicly 
held corporation that owns ten percent (10%) or more of Accusearch, Inc.’s stock.   
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Jurisdictional Statement 
 
Basis of District Court’s Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a Complaint in United States 
District Court for the District of Wyoming, alleging that Accusearch, Inc. and its 
President Jay Patel (collectively referred to as “Abika.com”), had engaged in an 
unfair trade practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a), and seeking permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement and 
other equitable relief pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §53(b).  Based upon these allegations, the Federal Trade 
Commission asserted that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, 1337(a), and 1345, and 15 U.S.C. §45(a) and 53(b).   
 Under the above cited United States Code sections, it is clear that the 
District Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over suits brought by the 
FTC under their unfair trade practice laws.  However, in this case, the FTC alleged 
that Abika.com’s practice of obtaining telephone call activity records was an unfair 
trade practice and one of the issues on appeal is whether or not the Federal Trade 
Commission has the authority and jurisdiction to prosecute matters related to 
telephone records or whether that authority is solely retained in the Federal 
Communications Commission.      
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Basis of Court of Appeals Jurisdiction 
 The Court of Appeals Jurisdiction is derived from 18 U.S.C. §1291, which 
gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction from all final decisions of the District 
Courts.  As set forth below in greater detail, the United States District Court for the 
District of Wyoming has entered its final decision in the case at hand. 
Filing Dates Establishing Timeliness of Appeal 
In this case, the authority fixing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal 
is set by Fed. R. App. 4(a)(1)(B).  Pursuant to this provision, since an agency of the 
United States, the FTC, is a party, the notice of appeal was due within sixty (60) 
days after the judgment or order appealed from was entered.  The District Court 
entered its final order disposing of all claims on December 20, 2007.  The Notice 
of Appeal was filed on January 9, 2008, well within the sixty (60) day time limit.  
The District Court advised that the record was ready for purposes of appeal on 
March 11, 2008.  Accordingly, pursuant to Fed. R. App. 31(a)(1) and 10th Cir. R. 
31.1(A)(1) appellants’ opening brief is due on or before April 21, 2008.   
Assertion Appeal is from Final Order 
 The “FTC” filed suit against Abika.com alleging that Abika.com had 
obtained and sold confidential consumer telephone records and that those actions 
constituted an unfair trade practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.  Abika.com sought to dismiss the case but the District Court denied this 
 2
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motion.  Abika.com, via a motion for summary judgment, sought immunity 
pursuant to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230.  In 
addition, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the unfair 
trade practice claim.  The District Court entered its order on the summary 
judgment motions and denied Abika.com immunity and ruled in favor of the FTC 
on the unfair trade practice claim.  However, the District Court’s order left open 
the issue of what, if any, type of equitable relief, including injunctive relief and 
disgorgement, ought to be imposed.  Abika.com sought permission from the 
District Court to take an immediate appeal since it had asserted but been denied 
immunity.  The District Court did not allow Abika.com to file an interlocutory 
appeal.  The parties submitted briefing on the issue of injunctive relief and 
disgorgement.  Ultimately, on December 20, 2007, the Court entered its Order and 
Judgment which ordered Abika.com to pay disgorgement and imposed injunctive 
relief.  This Order and Judgment, along with the Court’s previous Order denying 
Abika.com’s summary judgment motion based upon immunity and granting 
summary judgment on the FTC’s unfair trade practice claim, disposed of all claims 
raised in the case.   
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Statement of the Issues 
 
 
I. The District Court erred in denying Abika.com’s request for summary 
judgment based upon immunity pursuant to Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act. 
II. The District Court should not have imposed injunctive relief because 
there is an adequate remedy at law, including a criminal penalty, for the 
actions at issue.   
III. The injunction imposed by the District Court is not in the public 
interest, violates Abika.com’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and 
constitutes a prior restraint on speech in violation of Abika.com’s First 
Amendment rights. 
IV. The information at issue was not legally protected confidential 
information, but rather, was protected commercial speech, the FTC had 
no jurisdiction to enforce information related to telecommunications, 
and as such the District Court erred in denying Abika.com’s Motion to 
Dismiss.   
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Statement of the Case 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed suit against Accusearch Inc., 
d/b/a Abika.com and its President Jay Patel (herein collectively referred to as 
“Abika.com”) alleging that Abika.com had obtained and sold confidential 
consumer telephone records and that those actions constituted an unfair trade 
practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a), and 
seeking permanent injunctive relief, disgorgement and other equitable relief 
pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §53(b). 
(Complaint, Aplt. App. at 18-24).   
 Initially, Abika.com sought to dismiss the case. (Motion to Dismiss & Brief 
in Support, Aplt. App. at 25-56).  In its Complaint, the FTC stated that phone 
activity records were confidential under the Telecommunication Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§222, and that as such, the distribution of these records violated the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.  (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 20-21).  Abika.com directed the Court 
to the statutory language of the Telecommunication Act, which makes clear that 
the Act does not apply to Abika.com and as such Abika.com argued that the FTC’s 
claims had failed to assert a proper cause of action. (Brief in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, Aplt. App. at 29-30)  
Abika.com also argued that there was no law which made it illegal or 
improper to obtain phone records.  (Id.).  In the criminal context, courts have made 
 5
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it abundantly clear that individuals do not have any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their phone records. (Id. at 30).  Additionally, at the time Abika.com 
was offering searches for phone records, it was not illegal to do so.  This fact was 
made evident during Congressional hearings on the matter.  Ultimately, Congress 
did criminalize the distribution of this information, but at the time Abika.com 
offered these searches, it was not illegal.  Despite the lawful nature of the activity 
and the FTC’s inability to enforce the Telecommunications Act, the District Court 
denied Abika.com’s motion to dismiss. (Aplt. App. at 93-99, 101).      
Later, Abika.com filed for summary judgment seeking immunity pursuant to 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. §230 et seq. 
(Aplt. App. at 106-853).  Through the undisputed facts, Abika.com set forth the 
requirements of immunity under the CDA and demonstrated how it was within the 
purview of the Act and met all requirements, which are:  1) It is a user or provider 
of an interactive service provider; 2) It is not an information content provider with 
respect to the disputed activity; and 3) Plaintiff seeks to hold it liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of its service. Zeran v. America 
Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).  The undisputed facts are that 
Abika.com  is a website, which is considered to be an interactive computer service 
under the CDA.  Abika.com clearly did not create the phone records at issue, 
 6
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meaning that Abika.com is not an information content provider, and lastly, the 
FTC via its Complaint was seeking to hold Abika.com liable for this information.   
Prior to the Court entering an order on the CDA issue, both parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment on the unfair trade practice claim. (Aplt. 
App. at 903-1215 and 1216-1331).  The FTC first alleged in its Complaint that 
Abika.com had “used, or caused others to use, false pretenses, fraudulent 
statements, fraudulent or stolen documents or other misrepresentations, including 
posing as a customer of a telecommunications carrier, to induce officers, 
employees or agents of telecommunications carriers to disclose confidential 
customer phone records.” (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 21-22)  However, in its 
summary judgment argument the FTC conceded that Abika.com itself had not 
engaged in these activities, but argued that nonetheless Abika.com was still liable 
for an unfair trade practice by distributing these phone records, making Abika.com 
in essence vicariously liable for the actions of other parties, parties who allegedly 
did “use, false pretenses, fraudulent statements, fraudulent or stolen documents or 
other misrepresentations, including posing as a customer of a telecommunications 
carrier, to induce officers, employees or agents of telecommunications carriers to 
disclose confidential customer phone records.” (Id.) 
Abika.com also moved for summary judgment on the unfair trade practice 
claim. (Aplt. App. at 1216-1331).  Abika.com set forth that the FTC had failed to 
 7
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meet the elements of an unfair trade practice as the FTC produced no evidence that 
Abika.com had engaged in any false or fraudulent acts, failed to demonstrate 
substantial consumer injury, and failed to show that there were no countervailing 
benefits to the activity.  Further, Abika.com explained that injunctive relief was not 
necessary as Abika.com had ceased offering search services for phone records 
months prior to receiving the FTC’s Complaint and that since the initiation of the 
lawsuit Congress had enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Act, 
criminalizing the sale, transfer, purchase and receipt of confidential phone record 
information, which provided an adequate remedy at law thus rendering injunctive 
relief superfluous.  Abika.com also reiterated its previous argument that the FTC 
did not have jurisdiction over phone records.   
The District Court ruled on all three summary judgment motions in the same 
Order.  (Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1383-1404).  The District 
Court denied Abika.com immunity and ruled in favor of the FTC on the unfair 
trade practice claim.  However, the District Court’s Order left open what, if any, 
type of equitable relief should be imposed.  The District Court received additional 
briefing on this issue (Aplt. App. at 1405-1604), held a hearing, and ultimately 
ordered Abika.com to pay almost two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) in 
disgorgement and imposing broad injunctive relief, including prohibiting 
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Abika.com from offering any form of consumer personal information, not just 
phone record information. (Order and Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1605-1618).   
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Statement of the Facts 
 
 As noted by the District Court, “the relevant facts are undisputed.” (Order on 
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1384).  Accusearch, Inc. 
d/b/a Abika.com and its president and owner Jay Patel (collectively referred to as 
“Abika.com”) operates a home-based website that hosts an interactive person to 
person search engine that connects persons seeking information (searchers) to 
independent researchers who state that they can search that information for a fee. 
(Patel Affidavit, Aplt. App. at 144, 1244; Patel Deposition, Aplt. App. at pg. 
1252).   
 Independent researchers submit their requests to Abika.com to have their 
listings added to the website. (Aplt. App. at 144, 1245).  Abika.com does not 
solicit any specific type of search service, but rather, any researcher who offers a 
search service can list their services on the website. (Id.).   However, the 
researchers must agree to the terms of use for the website and also provide 
additional assurances to Abika.com that they will only conduct searches in 
compliance with federal, state, or local laws. (Id.; Duffy Declaration, Aplt. App. at 
1255-1263).  If a researcher claims to have any government issued licenses those 
licenses are checked by Abika.com to see if they are valid and current. (Id.).  If 
there is no licensing held by the researcher then a reference is required from any 
current or licensed researcher before the researcher can be listed on the website. 
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(Id.).  After this screening process, the researchers advertise on Abika.com the 
description of they services they offer and the criteria for the searches they 
conduct.  (Id.).   
Before listings for search services related to phone records were placed on 
the Abika.com website, Mr. Patel checked the internet and found hundreds of sites 
that offered phone call activity records and looked at the copyright notices at the 
bottom of the websites and searched waybackmachine.org to see how long some of 
these businesses had been in operation.  (Aplt. App. at 1246).  Mr. Patel also 
conducted internet research which also revealed an article from 1999 on Wired 
Magazine which indicated to him that the dissemination of phone records was 
legal. (Id.).  He also read an article from the Sidley Austin, LLP website regarding 
the case of AT&T v. Conboy, which indicated to him that telephone companies sold 
phone records and that it was legal to sell these records. (Id.).  In addition, Mr. 
Patel sent a facsimile to EPIC, a non-profit privacy group, asking if they were 
concerned about the dissemination of phone records, but he never received a 
response to this fax. (Id.).  On or about February 2003, independent researchers 
first listed on Abika.com’s website that they could search outgoing phone calls. 
(Aplt. App. at 146, 1246-47).   Independent researchers advertised on Abika.com 
that they could search “details of incoming or outgoing calls from any phone 
number, prepaid calling card or Internet Phone.  Phone searches are available for 
 11
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every country of the world.” (Id.).  Ultimately, four independent researchers listed 
their search services for phone calls on Abika.com after verbal and written 
verification that they would conduct their searches lawfully. (Id.; Aplt. App. at 
1256).  These researchers were: 1) PDJ Investigations; 2) AMS Research Services 
d/b/a Informationbrokers.net; 3) 1st Source Information Service; and 4) Double 
Helix Services, Inc. (Id.).   
 All searchers who use Abika.com's website fill out a search form, enter the 
search criteria and click the “next” button which takes the searcher to the search 
listings of the researchers. (Aplt. App. at 145, 1245).  The searcher reviews 
multiple researcher listings and then selects the independent researcher listing that 
the searcher is interested in. (Id.).  Upon selection, the searcher then must go to the 
terms of use page and read the terms of use for the website, including a listing of 
the site's permissible purposes. (Id.).  The terms of use page states that the searcher 
is hiring the independent researcher to conduct their search. (Id.).  The searcher can 
only proceed if he confirms that he has read and agrees to the terms of use. (Id.).  
The terms of use set forth permissible purposes for use of the website and for use 
of the information provided by the researchers. (Id.).  The searcher then completes 
the request by adding the payment information to his request. (Id.).   
 Each searcher’s request is screened and reviewed by Abika.com and/or the 
researcher. (Id.).  If Abika.com does not find any problems, then the searcher’s 
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request is forwarded to the researcher. (Id.).  If any search request creates 
suspicion, then either more information is requested for verification or the request 
is cancelled and refunded. (Id.).  When each request is forwarded to the researcher, 
Abika.com again notifies the researcher to process the search request only if it can 
conduct the search in compliance with federal, state, and local laws. (Id.; Aplt. 
App. at 1257-58).  Researchers are directed that if they cannot comply with 
federal, state, and local laws then they should cancel the request immediately. (Id.).   
Ultimately, Abika.com charges an administrative search fee to the searcher for the 
use of its interactive site and search engine. (Aplt. App. at 145, 1246).  The fee is 
based in part upon the costs that the independent researcher charges Abika.com for 
the search service. (Id.).  If the researcher does not find any problems and can 
lawfully complete the search then the researcher completes the search. (Id.).  The 
researcher emails the results to Accusearch which are then posted to the searcher's 
account on Abika.com. and emailed to the searcher.  (Id.).   
  With regard to searches for phone records, it is an undisputed fact that 
Abika.com had no direct contact with either account holders or 
telecommunications companies in regard to the requested searches. (Aplt. App. at 
146, 1247).  Abika.com did not engage in any false or fraudulent practices, such as 
pretexting, bribery, or hacking into any online accounts. (FTC Representative 
Deposition, Aplt. App. at 1265-1268, 1272).  Abika.com ceased allowing phone 
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record search listings on or about January 20, 2006 and no searches of this type 
have been advertised or processed by or through Abika.com since that date. (Aplt. 
App. at 147, 1248).  Abika.com ceased allowing phone record searches in January 
2006 when it learned through the news that a subsidiary of one of the independent 
researchers may have obtained data through the use of “pretexting.” (Id.). 
Abika.com has affirmatively stated that it will not offer listings related to phone 
record searches. (Id.).    
 Prior to the time Abika.com stopped offering phone record search listings, it 
was not unlawful to obtain phone records, even through pretexting, (although it is 
undisputed that Abika.com did not engage in pretexting or any fraudulent conduct.) 
(FTC Representative Deposition, Aplt. App. at 1265-1268, 1272).  The FTC also 
testified that:  "Prior to January 21, 2006, the Commission had no specific policy, 
rules, or regulations pertaining to the practice of obtaining and selling to third 
parties confidential consumer phone records without the consumer's knowledge or 
consent." (FTC Interrogatory Responses, Aplt. App. at 1295).   
On or about February 7, 2006, after Abika.com had ceased allowing any 
searches for phone records, the FTC sent cease and desist warning letters to 
approximately 20 other parties engaging in the acquisition or advertisement of 
access to phone records.  (FTC Interrogatory Responses, Aplt. App. at 1302-1303; 
Letter, Aplt. App. at 1310).  Prior to this time, hundreds of entities both on the 
 14
Appellate Case: 08-8003     Document: 0101458324     Date Filed: 04/23/2008     Page: 23     
internet and otherwise advertised that they would conduct phone records searches 
for third parties and such advertisements were widespread. (Duffy Declaration, 
Aplt. App. at 1256-57; Patel Affidavit, Aplt. App. 1246).  No warning cease and 
desist letter was sent to Abika.com, more than likely because Abika.com had 
already ceased the activity.  On May 1, 2006, nearly four months after Abika.com 
ceased advertising search access to phone records on its website and allowing any 
searches, the FTC filed the instant action. (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 18). 
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Summary of the Argument 
 First, the District Court incorrectly ruled that Abika.com was not covered by 
the immunity provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”).  Congress enacted the CDA to promote free speech and commerce on 
the Internet by eliminating liability against interactive services for injury caused by 
information provided by third parties.  In order to accomplish these objectives 
users or providers of interactive computer services are immune from liability in 
certain circumstances.  Under Section 230 of the CDA, a user or provider of an 
interactive computer service (such as a website) is immune from liability so long as 
it has not created or developed the content of the information upon which liability 
is based.  Courts interpreting the CDA have granted broad immunity in order to 
stay within the bounds of the statutory language and to promote Congress’ policy.  
Abika.com, and its activities related to phone call records, meets the requirements 
of immunity under the CDA.   
 Second, the District Court failed to apply sound legal principles in imposing 
injunctive relief against Abika.com.  Injunctive relief should be granted sparingly, 
and must only be imposed when there is no adequate remedy at law and only to 
prevent future harm.  In this case, there is an adequate remedy at law for the 
Government to avail itself.  In addition, Abika.com’s actions within this lawsuit 
demonstrate unlikely future harm and adequate deterrence for future harm.   In 
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2006 Congress criminalized selling, transferring, purchasing and receiving 
confidential phone record information.  This law was enacted prior to the District 
Court imposing injunctive relief.  Certainly a criminal law addressing the same 
issue provides an adequate remedy at law and deters future harm to the greatest 
extent allowable under the law.   Additionally, Abika.com had voluntarily ceased 
offering searches for phone records at least four months prior to the FTC initiating 
any action against them.  During the course of the suit Abika.com voluntarily 
offered to pay and did pay nearly $200,000 in disgorgement.  Therefore, 
Abika.com’s voluntary actions in ceasing searches and its voluntary act of paying 
disgorgement served as a deterrent to future harm as well.  Under these 
circumstances, injunctive relief was unnecessary and the District Court erred in 
imposing the relief.      
 Third, the injunctive relief imposed by the District Court violates 
Abika.com’s due process, First Amendment, and equal protection rights.  The 
District Court’s Order and Judgment prohibits Abika.com from obtaining any type 
of consumer personal information.  The Court imposed this prohibition despite not 
having made any finding that Abika.com had engaged in any unlawful activities 
with respect to any consumer personal information except for phone records.  By 
restricting Abika.com from offering other unrelated types of  information, the 
District Court violated Abika.com’s due process rights.  In addition, the Court’s 
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order creates a prior restraint on speech without any finding of unlawfulness in 
violation of the First Amendment.  Further, the District Court considered incorrect 
information as to similarly situated individuals in imposing greater relief against 
Abika.com.  As such, the District Court’s injunction is not proper.   
 Lastly, the District Court erred in not dismissing the Complaint originally.  
The FTC’s Complaint, alleging an unfair trade practice, only stands if its allegation 
that the phone records were “confidential” is correct.  The FTC bases the premise 
that the records were confidential on the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
However, this Act only applies to telecommunications carriers and in no way 
governs the activities of any third parties, such as Abika.com.  In addition, courts 
have consistently held that in the criminal context, individuals do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in phone records.  Furthermore, at the time 
Abika.com offered searches for phone records, it undisputedly was not illegal to 
obtain phone records, even via fraudulent means.  Congress later enacted the 
Telephone Records and Privacy Act Act, H.R. 4709, 109th Cong. (2006), which 
makes it illegal to obtain these records, but at the time of Abika.com’s activities, it 
was not unlawful.  Accordingly, not only was it lawful for Abika.com to engage in 
this activity, but it was commercial speech protected by the First Amendment.  
Further, the FTC admittedly has no jurisdiction or authority to regulate the 
Telecommunications Act.  As such, the FTC’s Complaint failed to state a cause of 
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action under F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6) and the FTC lacked the authority to prosecute and 
thus the Court lacked jurisdiction under 12(b)(1) and (b)(2).       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19
Appellate Case: 08-8003     Document: 0101458324     Date Filed: 04/23/2008     Page: 28     
Argument 
 
I. The District Court erred in denying Abika.com’s request for summary 
judgment based upon immunity pursuant to Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act. 
 
A. Introduction 
  
The Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) was designed to promote free 
speech and commerce over the Internet.  The CDA states that interactive computer 
services are not liable for information that it did not create.  In keeping with 
Congress’ goals in enacting the CDA, cases interpreting the Act have granted 
broad immunity.  Abika.com clearly fits within the statutory requirements to 
receive protection under the CDA and it functions in an analogous manner to other 
interactive computer services that have received protection under the CDA, 
including the Tenth Circuit case of Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. America 
Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, (10th Cir. 2000).   
B. Standard of Review 
 
 This Circuit has made clear that it will review a District Court order on 
summary judgment de novo and will review a District Court’s interpretation of a 
federal statute de novo.   
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same legal standard used by the district 
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). United States v. Hess, 
194 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir.1999).  We also review de 
novo the district court's interpretation of a federal statute. 
Id.  In construing a federal statute, we “‘give effect to the 
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will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed 
in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily 
be regarded as conclusive.’” Id. (quoting Negonsott v. 
Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 
457 (1993)). 
 
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000).   
C. Discussion 
 1. Legal Framework 
  a. Statutory Scheme 
 “Congress enacted §230 to promote freedom of speech in the ‘new and 
burgeoning Internet medium’ by eliminating the ‘threat [of] tort-based lawsuits’ 
against interactive services for injury caused by ‘the communications of others.’” 
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at fn. 3 (quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330 (4th Cir. 1997)).   
In enacting section 230 of the CDA, Congress expressly found that: 
The rapidly developing array of Internet and other 
interactive computer services available to individual 
Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources 
to our citizens.  . . . The Internet and other interactive 
computer services have flourished, the benefit of all 
American, with a minimum of government regulation. . 
. . Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive 
media for a verity of political, educational, cultural, and 
entertainment services.     
 
47 U.S.C. §230(a) (emphasis added).  Along these same lines, the Act clearly 
states:   
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It is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the 
continued development of Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media [and] to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”   
 
Id. at §230(b). 
 Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) states that 
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”  Therefore, under the CDA the Court must analyze whether the party 
from whom liability is sought is an interactive computer service and whether the 
party was the information content provider.  “In light of [Congress’] concerns, 
reviewing courts have treated §230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a 
relatively expansive definition of “interactive computer service” and a relatively 
restrictive definition of “information content provider.” Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Interactive Computer Services 
Section 230(f)(2) of the CDA defines “interactive computer services” as 
“any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer service, including 
specifically a service of system that provides access to the Internet . . .”  Case law 
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has made clear that a website constitutes an interactive computer service.  In Ben 
Ezra, the Court found that Plaintiff did not dispute that America Online fit within 
the definition of an interactive computer service.  Likewise, Amazon.com and 
eBay have been held to be internet service providers as have Matchmaker.com, 
Google, Inc. and Kinko's.  See Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 40-41 (Wash 
Ct. App. 2001); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 831 (Cal. 4th 2002); 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp.2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Parker 
v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  See also Donato v. Moldow, 
865 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. 2005) (holding local government website covered by 
Section 230).  It is equally clear that websites meet the definition of access 
software providers, which is defined as “a provider of software . . . , or enabling 
tools that do any one or more of the following:  (A) filter, screen, allow or disallow 
content; (B) pick, choose, analyze, or disallow content; or (C) transmit, receive, 
display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.”  
47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2). 
 In addition, the statute confers immunity not only to providers of interactive 
computer services, but also to users of interactive computer services.  47 U.S.C. 
§230(c)(1).  In the Ninth Circuit case of Batzel v. Smith, the Court discussed just 
such a situation, where immunity was conferred based upon the statutory language 
regarding a user of an interactive computer service. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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An individual named Smith sent a defamatory email regarding Batzel to a 
nonprofit Network that maintains a website and an electronic email newsletter. Id. 
at 1021.  The email was posted to the Network’s website and posted on the 
listserve. Id.  The Court, in analyzing whether the Network was protected under the 
CDA, stated:  
There is no dispute that the Network uses interactive 
computer services to distribute its on-line mailing and to 
post the listserve on its website.  Indeed, to make its 
website available and to mail out the listserve, the 
Network must access the Internet through some form of 
“interactive computer service.”   
 
Id. at 1031. 
Information Content Provider 
Information content provider is defined under the CDA as “any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.”  47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3).  Courts in numerous jurisdictions have narrowly 
interpreted the definition of information content providers.   
This Circuit has previously analyzed the CDA in the case of Ben Ezra, 206 
F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).  In Ben Ezra the Plaintiff brought claims for defamation 
and negligence, alleging that its stock quotes posted on America Online (“AOL”) 
contained inaccurate information. Id.  AOL asserted immunity under Section 230.  
This Circuit upheld the District Court’s grant of immunity to AOL, finding that 
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AOL was an interactive computer service provider and that AOL was not the 
information content provider. Id.  Plaintiff had alleged that AOL had worked so 
closely with the stock quote providers that AOL had operated as an information 
content provider.  This Circuit noted that “[w]hile [AOL] did communicate with 
[the stock quote providers] each time errors in the stock information came to its 
attention, such communications simply do not constitute the development or 
creation of the stock quotation information.” Id. at 985.     
 In the case of Batzel, discussed above, the Court notes that employees of the 
Network  
[o]bviously . . . did not create Smith’s email.  Smith 
composed the e-mail entirely on his own.  Nor do [the 
Network’s employee’s] minor alterations of Smith’s e-
mail prior to its posting or his choice to publish the e-
mail . . . rise to the level of “development.” . . . The 
“development of information” therefore means 
something more substantial than merely editing portions 
of an e-mail and selecting material for publication.  
Because [the Network’s employee] did no more than 
select and make minor alterations to Smith's e-mail, [the 
Network] cannot be considered the content provider of 
Smith's e-mail for purposes of § 230.”  
 
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031.    
 The Ninth Circuit has also interpreted “information content provider” 
narrowly in keeping with Congress’ goals.  In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 
Metrrosplash.com provided a matchmaking service online.  339 F.3d 1119, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2003).  In order to participate in the matchmaking service, members had to 
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complete a detailed questionnaire that was created by Metrosplash.com.  Id. at 
1121.  In discussing whether the creation of this questionnaire destroyed immunity, 
the Court stated that “[u]nder §230(c), therefore, so long as a third party willingly 
provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider receives 
full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.  The fact that 
some of the content was formulated in response to Matchmaker’s questionnaire 
does not alter this conclusion.” Id. at 1124.        
 The Seventh Circuit has also addressed the definition of information content 
provider in the case of Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., 
v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 07-1101, 2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. 2008).  Craigslist was 
sued on the basis that some of the notices posted on the website advertising 
housing violated the Fair Housing Act. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Craigslist had 
“caused” the discriminatory statements. Id. at *5.  The Court in response, notes: 
Doubtless craigslist plays a casual role in the sense that 
no one could post a discriminatory ad if craigslist did not 
offer a forum.  That is not, however, a useful definition 
of cause.  One might as well say that people who save 
money “cause” bank robbery, because if there were not 
banks there could be no bank robberies.  . . . If cragslist 
“causes” the discriminatory notices, then so do phone 
companies and courier services (and, for that matter, the 
firms that make the computers and software that owners 
use to post their notices online), yet no one could think 
that Microsoft and Dell are liable for “causing” 
discriminatory advertisements.  
 
Id.    
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   b. Case Law  
 The case law interpreting immunity under the CDA grants broad immunity 
in keeping with Congress’ findings and policy of the CDA.  As discussed below, 
reviewing courts have upheld CDA immunity for non-defamation claims, 
including claims sounding in distributor liability, for websites that utilize a sales 
model approach rather than a bulletin board approach, even if the websites pay for 
the material, and even when the material provided is itself illegal.    
Non-Defamation Claims and Distributor Liability 
 The CDA provides immunity to numerous causes of action and is not limited 
only to defamation cases.  The word defamation does not appear in the statute.  
The CDA provides immunity to users and providers of interactive computer 
services who are not information content providers with respect to the offending 
information.  This statutory language covers a myriad of situations that arise for 
users and providers of interactive computer services.  As such, numerous 
reviewing courts have appropriately applied CDA immunity to a broad variety of 
claims.  See, e.g. Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (negligence claim); 
Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 300 (4th Cir. 1997) (negligence claims);  Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (invasion of privacy, 
misappropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and negligence); Beyond 
Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536 (D. Md. 2006) (claim under 
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Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. Civ. 05-
926-AA, 2005 WL 3005602 at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2005) (negligence claim 
resulting in personal injury); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 
3813758 at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (negligence, negligence per se, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, civil conspiracy, 
and distribution of child pornography).  “Nothing on the face of the statute 
supports [a] narrow interpretation that the CDA’s immunity applies only to cases 
involving defamation and defamation-related claims. 47 U.S.C. §230.” Doe v. 
Myspace, Inc., et al., Case No. A-06-CA-983-SS (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2007).    
 Along these same lines of providing immunity to cases that are not 
defamation cases, reviewing courts have also made clear that distributor liability is 
a subset of publisher liability and as such is also immune from suit under Section 
230.  “[E]very court to reach the issue has decided that Congress intended to 
immunize both distributor and publishers.”  Batzel, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.10 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-34; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1013-17 (Fla. 2001)).  
“Any attempt to distinguish between ‘publisher’ liability and notice-based 
‘distributor’ liability and to argue that Section 230 was only intended to immunize 
the former would be unavailing.” Blumenthal v. Drudge, et al., Civil Action No. 
97-1968 (D.C. Apr. 22, 1998).  The theory of distributor liability “is merely a 
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subset, or species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by §230.”  
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-34 (4th Cir. 1997).   
Sales Model and Payment for Material 
 Additionally, courts have held that for purposes of the CDA, there is no 
distinction between websites that sell items rather than websites where other 
individuals simply post information.  In the case of Stoner v. eBay, Inc. the Court 
stated: 
Plaintiff attempts to draw a distinction between eBay’s 
interactive service, which he argues is based on a sales 
model, and other interactive services which are based on 
bulletin board models.  While the majority of cases 
addressing CDA immunity may fit the bulletin board 
description, nothing in those cases or in the statutory 
language so limits the CDA’s application.  A principle 
objective of the immunity provision is to encourage 
commerce over the Internet by ensuring that interactive 
computer service providers are not held responsible for 
how third parties use their services.  
 
Cal. Rptr. 2d, 2000 WL 1705637 at *3 (Cal. 2000).   
Further, in the case of Blumenthal v. Drudge, et al., America Online 
(“AOL”) contracted with and paid Drudge to prepare the “Drudge Report” which 
amounted to a gossip and rumor report. Civil Action No. 97-1968 (D.C. Apr. 22, 
1998).  AOL also advertised this service and promoted the service to its 
subscribers. The Court noted that AOL was not a “passive conduit,” but that 
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immunity under the CDA was appropriate even when AOL had an active and 
aggressive role in making the information available.    
Illegal Information 
The nature of the information distributed is not dispositive of the issue of 
whether or not immunity under Section 230 applies.  Even if the information 
distributed is illegal, this does not affect immunity under Section 230.  In fact, 
Section 230 ensures that redress for the illegal information is obtained from the 
true wrong-doer and not the user or provider of the interactive computer service.  
In the Stoner case, the Plaintiff alleged that eBay’s auction business sold 
contraband sound recordings. 2000 WL 1705637 at *1-2 (Cal. 2000).  The Court 
addressed the basis under which Plaintiff was seeking to hold eBay liable and 
determined eBay was entitled to immunity under Section 230 even if the items it 
sold were illegal.    
The more difficult question is whether plaintiff is seeking 
to hold eBay responsible for content provided by third 
parties. . . . However, plaintiff contends that eBay's 
services constitute more than mere publication of product 
descriptions prepared by others, and are instead 
independent acts of eBay in furtherance of illegal sales. 
Therefore, plaintiff claims, this suit does not seek to hold 
eBay responsible for the publication of information 
provided by others, but for eBay's own participation in 
selling contraband musical recordings. 
Despite plaintiff's attempt to characterize eBay as an 
active participant in the sale of products auctioned over 
its service, plaintiff is seeking to hold eBay responsible 
for informing prospective purchasers that illegal 
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recordings may be purchased-information that originates 
with the third party sellers who use the computer service. 
The uncontroverted facts establish that eBay's role does 
not extend beyond the scope of the federal immunity. . . .  
eBay provides interactive computer services for which it 
charges a fee, just as America Online provides interactive 
services for which it charges a fee.    
 
Id. at *2.  The same analysis was set forth in the Craigslist case.  No. 07-1101, 
2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. 2008).  The housing notices placed on Craigslist 
violated the Fair Housing Act, however the Craigslist website was not found to be 
liable under Section 230.  Id.   
 The cases of Doe v. American Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) and 
Doe v. Bates, et al., No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. 
Dec. 27, 2006) addressed immunity under the CDA when the information provided 
was illegal, namely child pornography.  In each of these cases, immunity was 
upheld.    
  2. Analysis 
In spite of all of the case law from reviewing courts granting broad 
immunity under the CDA and although the activities of Abika.com fit squarely 
within the definitions and protections under Section 230 of the CDA, the District 
Court incorrectly held that Abika.com should not be given immunity.   
Abika.com fits all three requirements for immunity under Section 230, 
which are:  1) It is a user or provider of an interactive service provider; 2) It is not 
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an information content provider with respect to the disputed activity; and 3) 
Plaintiff seeks to hold it liable for information originating with a third-party user of 
its service. Stoner, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. 2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37, 40-41 (Wash Ct. App. 2001). 
As noted by the district Court, the relevant facts are not in dispute.  What is 
at issue before this Court is how those facts should have been applied to the law.  
As set out below, Abika.com fits within the statutory requirements for immunity 
under Section 230.   
Factual Analysis 
Abika.com operated such that any independent researcher who agrees to the 
terms of use of the website and who provides assurances to Abika.com that they 
will conduct their searches in compliance with federal, state, and local laws, can 
submit its request to have their search listings added to the Abika.com website. 
(Aplt. App. at 144, 1245, 1255-63).  After agreeing to these terms and undergoing 
a screening process, the researchers advertised on Abika.com the description of the 
search services and criteria for the searches they conducted.  (Aplt. App. at 144, 
1245).   
All searchers who use Abika.com's website fill out a search form, enter the 
search criteria and click the “next” button which takes the searcher to the search 
listings of the researchers. (Aplt. App. at 145, 1245).  The searcher reviews 
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multiple researcher listings and then selects the independent researcher listing that 
the searcher is interested in. (Id.).  Upon selection, the website requires the 
searcher to go to the terms of use page and read the terms of use for the website, 
which includes a listing of the site's permissible purposes and states that the 
searcher is hiring the independent researcher to conduct their search. (Id.).  The 
searcher can only proceed if he confirms that he has read and agrees to the terms of 
use. (Id.).   Each request is screened and reviewed by Abika.com and/or the 
researcher and then the searcher’s request is forwarded to the researcher. (Id.).  
When each request is forwarded to the researcher, Abika.com again notifies the 
researcher to process the search request only if it can conduct the search in 
compliance with federal, state, and local laws. (Id.; Duffy Declaration, Aplt. App. 
at 1257-58).  Researchers are directed that if they cannot comply with federal, 
state, and local laws then they should cancel the request immediately. (Id.).   
Ultimately, Abika.com charges an administrative search fee to the searcher for the 
use of its interactive site and search engine, although on occasion that fee may be 
refunded to the searcher. (Id.).  Ultimately, the researcher emails the results to 
Accusearch which are then posted to the searcher's account on Abika.com. and 
emailed to the searcher.  (Id.).   
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User or Provider of Interactive Service Provider 
 The District Court correctly concluded that Abika.com is a provider of 
an interactive computer service.  Again, Section 230(f)(2) defines “interactive 
computer services” as “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
service, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the 
Internet . . .”  Websites are considered interactive service providers.  Website sites 
are also clearly access software providers which are also defined as an interactive 
service provider.  It is undisputed that Abika.com is a website and that Abika.com 
uses the internet and e-mail in providing its interactive service. (Patel Deposition, 
Aplt. App. at 878-79, 885-87).  Declarations provided by the FTC also state that 
Abika.com is a website.  (Quale Declaration, Aplt. App at 652-63; Wolf 
Declaration, Aplt. App. at 789-90).  The FTC’s pleadings also repeatedly 
characterized Abika.com as a website. (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 21).   
The District Court correctly held: 
Courts have generally found that websites are 
“interactive computer services” within in the meaning of 
the CDA.  See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 
n.16 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that several courts that have 
reached the issue “have decided that a website is an 
‘interactive computer service’).  Nor does that retail 
nature of the Abika.com website necessarily take it 
outside the purview of the CDA. See Almedia v. 
Amazon.com, (S.D. Fla. July 30, 2004), aff’d on other 
grounds, 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Schneider v. 
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Amazon.com, 108 Wash. App. 454, 31 P.2d 37, 40-41 
(Wash. App. 2001).  The Court finds that the language of 
the statute is broad enough to encompass the Abika.com 
website.  Accordingly, the first Section 230 requirement 
is met. 
 
(Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1390).  In addition, the statutory 
language also provides immunity to users of interactive computer services.  Batzel, 
333 F.3d at 1031.  The undisputed facts show Abika.com used an interactive 
computer service to access the Internet and to send and receive e-mails.  (Patel 
Affidavit, Aplt. App. at 145, 1245-46; Wolf Declaration, Aplt. App. at 789-90).  
Clearly Abika.com is both a user and provider of an interactive computer service 
and as such, meets the first requirement of immunity under Section 230.   
Not An Information Content Provider 
 In spite of voluminous case law to the contrary and without regard to the 
clear facts which were undisputed and evident in the record, the District Court 
found that Abika.com was an information content provider with respect to the 
phone activity records.  
 The CDA defines “information content provider” as “any person or entity 
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service.”  47 U.S.C. §230(f)(3) (emphasis added).    
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It is undisputed that Abika.com did not provide the information content of 
the disputed activity.  Although the parties characterize the individuals involved in 
the process differently, it is undisputed that four independent researchers, PDJ 
Investigations, AMS Research Services d/b/a Informationbrokers.net, 1st Source 
Information Service, and Double Helix Services, Inc, provided the call activity 
records to Abika.com who then either posted the information to the searchers 
account or emailed the information to the searcher.  (Patel Affidavit, Aplt. App. at 
146, 1247).  The FTC stated that these four researchers provided the phone 
records, and through discovery provided emails containing search results from 
phone call activity searches which were sent from the researchers to Defendants, 
and discussed the information from the researchers with Mr. Patel during his 
deposition. (Patel Deposition, Aplt. App. at 880-82, 901-902).  Even under the 
FTC’s theory that Abika.com is a retail website, Abika.com would not be 
considered the information content provider, as a retailer obtains the items it sells 
from manufacturers. (Order on Cross-Motions SJ, Aplt. App. at 1384).  
The District Court’s holding with regard to whether or not Abika.com was 
the information content provider contradicts itself.  First, the District Court clearly 
states, “The phone records at issue in this case clearly were ‘created’ (at least 
originally) by various telephone companies for lawful purposes.”  (Order on Cross-
Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1395).  Additionally, the District Court’s Order also 
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states “The Complaint does not allege that the Defendants themselves contacted 
the telephone companies or directly obtained the telephone records at issue in this 
case.” (Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1385-86).  However, after 
making these statements, the District Court summarily concludes: 
While Defendants made admittedly few changes to the 
records themselves, the Court finds that by soliciting 
requests for such phone records and purchasing them for 
resale, Defendants “participat[ed] in the creation or 
development of [the] information, and thus [do] not 
qualify for §230 Immunity.” Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 980 
n.4.”   
 
(Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1395).  The District Court readily 
admits Abika.com did not create the phone records, nor did they directly obtain the 
records, nonetheless the District Court incorrectly surmises that because 
Abika.com on behalf of searchers solicits this information, it has somehow created 
or developed the information.  This analysis does not follow existing case law.  
The analysis set forth in the Craigslist case is applicable here.  In Craigslist the 
Court stated that Craigslist had not caused any discriminatory notices by having a 
forum in which people can post such notices an analogized that under a theory 
where Craigslist was deemed to have caused the messages, so had the company 
that created the computer. No. 07-1101, 2008 WL 681168, at *5 (7th Cir. 2008).  In 
the same manner Abika.com can not be found to have created or to have 
“participated in the creation” of phone records simply by having a forum in which 
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people advertise and request this information.  For example, under the theory 
utilized by the District Court, AOL would not have immunity in the Ben Ezra case 
because AOL solicited requests for stock information to post on its website. 206 
F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000).  Similarly, the Network in the Batzel case, solely by 
virtue of requesting and allowing people to send the Network emails and by 
sending those emails out on the listserve, would not receive immunity.  In the 
Blumenthal case, AOL solicited, contracted, and paid for the Drudge Report. Civil 
Action No. 97-1968 (D.C. Apr. 22, 1998).  However, the Blumenthal Court held 
that the soliciting of this information did not mean that AOL was “responsible, in 
whole or in part for the creation or development” of the information. 47 U.S.C. 
§230(f)(3); Id.  Using the District Court’s theory, any website that offered a chat 
room would be considered to have solicited information and as such, would be 
considered the information content provider of any information posted within the 
chat room.   
 Additionally, looking at the plain language of the statute and the common 
usage of the words create and develop, the District Court’s analysis does not make 
sense.   
 Webster’s Online dictionary defines create as:   
1. Make or cause to be or to become; "make a mess in 
one's office"; "create a furor". 
2. Bring into existence; "The company was created 25 
years ago"; "He created a new movement in painting". 
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* * *  
6. Create or manufacture a man-made product: "We 
produce more cars than we can sell"; "The company has 
been making toys for two centuries". 
  
Webster’s Online dictionary contains the following definitions for develop:   
1. Make something new, such as a product or a mental or 
artistic creation; "Her company developed a new kind of 
building material that withstands all kinds of weather"; 
"They developed a new technique". 
* * *  
5. Come into existence; take on form or shape; "A new 
religious movement originated in that country" "a love 
that sprang up from friendship," "the idea for the book 
grew out of a short story"; "An interesting phenomenon 
uprose". 
 
If Congress meant for mere solicitation of information to destroy immunity, 
then Congress would have included such language.  “In construing a federal 
statute, we ‘give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been 
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive.’”  Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 984 (quoting Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 
99, 104, 113 S.Ct. 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 457 (1993)).  The District Court cannot 
impose additional language into the statute.  In reaching its conclusion, the District 
Court added to the statutory language stating that the “by soliciting requests for 
such phone records and purchasing them for resale, Defendants “participat[ed] in 
the creation or development of [the] information.” (Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, 
Aplt. App. at 1395).  The statute says nothing of “soliciting” information and 
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soliciting information is entirely different from creating or developing the 
information.   As a matter of law, the District Court’s analysis as to whether or not 
Abika.com was an information content provider of phone records was incorrect.   
Liability For Information Originating with a Third-Party 
The third requirement to obtain immunity is that the Plaintiff seeks to hold 
the user or provider of interactive computer services liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of its service. Stoner, 2000 WL 1705637 (Cal. 
2000); Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 
P.3d 37, 40-41 (Wash Ct. App. 2001).  Section 230 states:  “No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. 
§230(c).  The District Court’s Order states that “[n]otably . . . the FTC’s Complaint 
does not sound in defamation.” (Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 
1392).  However, as discussed previously, immunity under Section 230 has been 
applied to a myriad of causes of action, including negligence (including negligence 
resulting in personal injury), negligence per se, invasion of privacy, 
misappropriation of the right of publicity, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, civil conspiracy, and distribution of child pornography.   
Clearly, the FTC through its Complaint sought to hold Abika.com liable for 
information that originated with a third-party.  At the heart of the FTC’s 
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Complaint, although phrasing the cause of action in terms of an unfair trade 
practice, the actions which the FTC alleges are improper, are at their core, 
distribution and publication of phone call activity records.  Any assertion that the 
FTC is not treating Abika.com as a publisher or distributor is an argument of form, 
not substance.   
The circumstances in the Stoner case are akin to the present case.   
The more difficult question is whether plaintiff is seeking 
to hold eBay responsible for content provided by third 
parties. . . . [P]laintiff contends that eBay's services 
constitute more than mere publication of product 
descriptions prepared by others, and are instead 
independent acts of eBay in furtherance of illegal sales. 
Therefore, plaintiff claims, this suit does not seek to hold 
eBay responsible for the publication of information 
provided by others, but for eBay's own participation in 
selling contraband musical recordings. 
Despite plaintiff's attempt to characterize eBay as an 
active participant in the sale of products auctioned over 
its service, plaintiff is seeking to hold eBay responsible 
for informing prospective purchasers that illegal 
recordings may be purchased-information that originates 
with the third party sellers who use the computer service. 
The uncontroverted facts establish that eBay's role does 
not extend beyond the scope of the federal immunity. . . .  
eBay provides interactive computer services for which it 
charges a fee, just as America Online provides interactive 
services for which it charges a fee.    
 
2000 WL 1705637 at *2.  Although the claims are cleverly brought fashioned in 
different terminology, at the core it is the publishing and distribution of the 
information which forms the basis of the Complaint.  The FTC by alleging that 
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Abika.com has “made information available,” “disclosed” information, and “sold 
information” is really alleging publication and distribution of the information.  In 
this regard, FTC is treating and attempting to hold Abika.com liable for publishing 
and distributing the information provided by the researchers, for which Abika.com 
is immune under the CDA.    
 This District Court also used improper factors, including that Abika.com 
advertised, solicited and purchased the information, as a basis that it would not 
grant Abika.com immunity. (Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1395).  
Again, in the Blumenthal case AOL contracted with and paid Drudge to prepare a 
gossip report entitled the “Drudge Report.”  Civil Action No. 97-1968 (D.C. Apr. 
22, 1998).  AOL actively advertised this service and promoted the service to its 
subscribers.  The Court found that immunity under the CDA was appropriate even 
when AOL had an active and aggressive role in making the information available, 
including paying for the information.  Id.  The factors the District Court utilized in 
making its determination are not factors that destroy immunity, yet the District 
Court held as such.        
3. Policy 
Ultimately, it appears that the District Court based its decision upon the 
discomfort it feels with having phone records published.  The District Court went 
to any length to achieve its desired result, including ignoring case law and 
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imposing additional statutory language.  There are other cases in the CDA world 
where the information that was disseminated was offensive, sexist, racist, and 
oftentimes illegal.  Nonetheless, Congress chose to immunize users and providers 
from civil liability for information they did not create or develop.   
The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to 
discern. Congress recognized the threat that tort-based 
lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium. The imposition of tort 
liability on service providers for the communications of 
others represented, for Congress, simply another form of 
intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 
was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of 
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum.  
None of this means, of course, that the original culpable 
party who posts defamatory messages would escape 
accountability. . . . Congress made a policy choice, 
however, not to deter harmful online speech through the 
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies 
that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially 
injurious messages. 
 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. 
As pointed out by the Court in Batzel, oftentimes Congress’ decision to 
enact the CDA creates case-by-case results that are uncomfortable, noting “[a]s 
other courts have pointed out, the broad immunity created by §230 can sometimes 
lead to troubling results.  See, e.g., Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51-52(expressing 
opinion that “[i]f it were writing on a clean slate,” AOL would be liable for 
defamation when it had editorial control over the defamatory material).” 333 F.3d 
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at 1031 n.19.  However, also as noted by the Batzel court, district court’s cannot 
circumvent the law Congress enacted – no matter how uncomfortable the result.1         
Although perhaps at times following the CDA provides troubling results, the CDA 
actually serves to encourage aggrieved parties to seek their remedy from the true 
wrongdoers. As noted in Zeran “[n]one of this means [under the CDA], of course, 
that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would escape 
accountability.” 129 F.3d at 330-31.   
 Ultimately, society as a whole benefits from the immunity Congress granted 
under the CDA and the case law which interprets that immunity broadly.  The 
Internet opens up a world of information, commercial opportunity, and 
convenience for individuals to access information and products on the Internet.  
Congress, in enacting the CDA recognized this opportunity and convenience and 
chose to protect users and providers of interactive computer services from civil 
liability in order to ensure these benefits.  All of the case law discussed above 
serves to provide broad immunity under Section 230, the purpose of which is to 
ensure benefit to society.  When wrongdoing occurs over the Internet, the wronged 
individual has a full opportunity to seek redress from the wrongdoer.  The CDA 
only protects the interactive computer services.  Many of the cases cited herein are 
                                                 
1 With regard to phone call activity records, in 2006 Congress enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Act 
(“Act”), H.R. 4709, 109th Cong. (2006).  This Act criminalizes selling, transferring, purchasing and receiving 
confidential phone record information.  The enactment of this Act gives the Government broad power to act with 
regard to the distribution of telephone records and provides an adequate remedy at law.   
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from other jurisdictions and are not binding on this Circuit.  However, this Circuit 
should adopt the reasoning of the other jurisdictions that have granted broad 
immunity under Section 230 in order to effectuate the plain language of the statute 
and to promote Congress’ rationale in adopting the CDA. 
Conclusion of CDA Issue 
The Abika.com website and its functions and activities with regard to phone 
records fit squarely within the requirements of immunity under the CDA.  
Additionally, the operations of Abika.com mirror the operations this Circuit held to 
be immune in the Ben Ezra case.  In Ben Ezra, AOL advertised the availability of 
stock data, solicited requests for orders for the data, purchased the data from third 
party sources for a fee, and then re-sold the data to paying subscribers only.  Only 
paying subscribers, not society as a whole, had access to the data.  Similarly, 
Abika.com advertised the availability of phone records, solicited requests for 
orders for the information, purchased the information from third party sources for a 
fee, and then re-sold the information to paying searchers only.  Accordingly, 
Abika.com requests that this Court find as a matter of law that Abika.com’s 
activities with respect to phone call records meets the requirements of immunity 
under Section 230 and as such hold that Abika.com is immune from the claims 
asserted by the FTC.    
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II. The District Court should not have imposed injunctive relief because 
there is an adequate remedy at law, including a criminal penalty, for the 
actions at issue.   
 
A. Introduction 
  
 Injunctive relief is a drastic relief and should be imposed only when there is 
no adequate remedy at law and only to prevent future harm.  Months prior to the 
FTC filing its Complaint against Abika.com voluntarily ceased offering searches 
for phone records. (Aplt. App. 147, 1248).  During the course of the lawsuit, 
Abika.com agreed to pay nearly $200,000 in disgorgement, in essence putting its 
money where its mouth is and constituting an affirmative statement that it would 
no longer engage in the complained of activities.  In addition, prior to the Court 
imposing injunctive relief, Congress enacted a law which made it a crime to sell, 
transfer, purchase or receive confidential phone record information.  These 
combined circumstances provide an adequate remedy at law and sufficiently deter 
future harm, making imposition of injunctive relief unnecessary and unlawful.   
 B. Standard of Review 
 
 The Standard of Review of a District Court’s order imposing injunctive 
relief is abuse of discretion. Signature Properties Intern. Ltd. P’ship. v. City of 
Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2002).  “The district court's discretion is 
not unbounded, of course, and in particular its judgment is to be guided by ‘sound 
legal principles.’” Id. at 1268-69.   
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C. Discussion 
 1. Legal Framework 
Injunctive relief is a drastic remedy and therefore, its imposition should not 
be undertaken lightly. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980).  “Because 
injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the power to issue injunctions should be 
exercised ‘sparingly and cautiously, and only in cases reasonably free from 
doubt.’” Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d 977, 980 (Okla. 
Civ. App. Div. 4, 2000).  Injunctions can carry civil and criminal penalties.  
Further, injunctions can result in very real and practical losses, such as the loss of 
personal and professional reputation, employment prospects, the total loss of a 
business and an individual’s financial livelihood.      
 Injunctive relief is designed for a very narrow purpose.  Courts have made 
clear that the sole purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent future harm.  
“Injunctive relief is designed to prevent future wrongs, not to punish past acts.” 
Abu-Nantambu-El v. Lovingier, 2007 WL 684132 at *7 (D. Colo. 2007) (quoting 
Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 1374 (D.C. Cal. 1975)).  Simply 
because a court has the power to issue an injunction does not mean the court 
should.  “Indeed, under appropriate circumstances, the district court may justifiably 
withhold injunctive relief altogether even though the law has been violated by the 
party sought to be enjoined.”  Prows v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 
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468 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted).  Further, injunctive relief is a form 
of equitable relief and a court of equity will not undertake a useless activity.  New 
York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971).  Clearly, an injunction is not 
warranted where there is an adequate criminal remedy. U.S. v. Petersen, 91 
F.Supp. 209, (S.D. Cal. 1950) aff’d 191 F.2d 154, cert. denied 72 S.Ct. 174, 342 
U.S. 885, 96 L.Ed. 664.      
The language of the FTC Act itself makes clear that injunctions are not 
automatic, but that “in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper 
proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction.” 15 U.S.C. §53(b) (emphasis 
added).  Although the FTC Act allows for injunctive relief, it is “a remedy whose 
basis ‘in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of 
legal remedies.’” Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975) (citing 
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507 (1959)).  When there is 
an adequate remedy at law, the Court should not issue an injunction.   
2. Analysis  
Activities are Now Criminally Proscribed 
 In the case at hand, the activities complained of are now criminally 
proscribed, thus eliminating the possibility of future harm to the greatest extent 
allowed by the law and creating an adequate remedy at law.  In 2006, after the FTC 
filed its Complaint but prior to the time the District Court imposed injunctive relief 
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against Abika.com, Congress enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Act 
(“Act”). H.R. 4079, 109th Cong. (2006).  This Act criminalizes selling, transferring, 
purchasing and receiving confidential phone record information.  The Act gives the 
Government broad power to act with regard to the distribution of telephone records 
and provides an adequate remedy at law.   
Since the sole purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent future harm this 
equitable remedy is available only when there is no adequate remedy at law.  
Based upon the fact that Congress has now criminalized the activities complained 
of, the District Court should not have imposed injunctive relief.  “[I]n order for [a] 
Court to issue an injunction it would require a showing that such an injunction 
would enhance the already existing power of the Government to act.  It is a 
traditional axiom of equity that a court of equity will not do a useless thing just as 
it is a traditional axiom that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime.” 
New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971) See also Nat’l Ass’n of 
Letter Carriers v. Indep. Postal Sys. of Am., Inc., 470 F.2d 265, 271 (10th Cir. 
1972); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 148 (2006).  The injunction in this case does 
not enhance the power of the Government to act and as such was improper.   
Voluntary Cessation and Payment of Disgorgement 
In addition to the fact that the activities are now criminally proscribed, 
Abika.com voluntarily ceased all of these activities months prior to receiving the 
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FTC’s Complaint. (Aplt. App. at 147, 1248).  “[A]lthough the defendant's 
voluntary cessation of the challenged practice does not moot the case, ‘[s]uch 
abandonment is an important factor bearing on the question whether a court should 
exercise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice.’”  Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193 (2000).  Abika.com 
stopped allowing searches for phone records in January of 2006. (Id.).  On or about 
February 7, 2006, the FTC sent cease and desist warning letters to approximately 
20 other parties engaging in the acquisition or advertisement of access to consumer 
phone records.  (Id.; Letter, Aplt. App. at 1310).  Prior to this time, hundreds of 
entities both on the internet and otherwise advertised that they would conduct 
phone records searches for third parties and such advertisements were widespread. 
(Patel Affidavit, Aplt. App. at 1246; Duffy Declaration, Aplt. App. at 1256-57).   
No warning cease and desist letter was sent to Abika.com, seemingly because 
Abika.com had already ceased the activity.  On May 1, 2006, nearly four months 
after Abika.com ceased advertising search access to phone records on its website 
and allowing any searches, the FTC filed the instant action.  (Complaint, Aplt. 
App. at 18). 
Separate and apart from the injunctive relief, Abika.com agreed to and paid 
the FTC $199,692.71 in disgorgement.  Payment of this extensive disgorgement 
amount also serves as a substantial deterrent and Abika.com’s voluntary payment 
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of the disgorgement also demonstrates that they will comply and there will be no 
future harm.   
Conclusion of Injunction Issue 
Although the District Court had discretion in determining whether or not to 
impose injunctive relief, it was still bound to make its determination based upon 
“sound legal principles.” Signature Properties Intern. Ltd. P’ship. v. City of 
Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2002).  Taking into account only the fact 
that the complained of activity is now criminally proscribed, justifies Abika.com’s 
position that the District Court should not have entered injunctive relief.  However, 
this fact taken with all the other undisputed facts, that the FTC never issued any 
warning to Abika.com and that Abika.com voluntarily stopped offering listings for 
phone records months before any action by the FTC, and that Abika.com paid 
nearly $200,000 in disgorgement, supports that the District Court erred in imposing 
injunctive relief against Abika.com.  The criminal law provides an adequate 
remedy at law and deters future harm.  Abika.com’s voluntary cessation and 
voluntary payment of disgorgement also clearly demonstrate adequate deterrence 
and assurance that there will not be any future harm.  Therefore, Abika.com 
respectfully requests that this Court find that based upon the circumstances of this 
case, the District Court abused its discretion and hold that injunctive relief is not 
appropriate.     
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III. The injunction imposed by the District Court is not in the public 
interest, violates Abika.com’s Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and 
constitutes a prior restraint on speech in violation of Abika.com’s First 
Amendment rights.  
 
A. Introduction 
  
 The District Court’s injunction broadly prohibits Abika.com from 
“purchasing, marketing, offering for sale, or selling, or causing another to 
purchase, market, offer for sale, or sell consumer personal information,” 
information that the District Court did not find to be unlawful.  (Order and 
Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1606-1608).  Allowing the District Court to enjoin 
activities that it has not found to be unlawful violates Abika.com’s due process 
rights.  Further, restricting Abika.com’s free speech rights by prohibiting the 
distribution of information the District Court has not found is unlawful, constitutes 
a prior restraint on speech and violates Abika.com’s First Amendment rights.     
 B. Standard of Review 
 
 The Standard of Review of a District Court’s order imposing injunctive 
relief is abuse of discretion. Signature Properties, 310 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 
2002).  “The district court's discretion is not unbounded, of course, and in 
particular its judgment is to be guided by ‘sound legal principles.’” Id. at 1268-69.   
C. Discussion 
The District Court’s Order and Judgment imposed injunctive relief that 
violates Abika.com’s First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and as such, is 
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not in the public interest.  “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the 
violation of a party's constitutional rights.” G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor 
Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2907, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979); 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th 
Cir.1987)).   
Fifth Amendment Due Process Violation 
The District Court imposed injunctive relief that not only banned Abika.com 
from selling customer phone records, but also prohibited Abika.com from 
“purchasing, marketing, offering for sale, or selling, or causing another to 
purchase, market, offer for sale, or sell consumer personal information.” (Order 
and Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1606-1608).  The District Court painted with too 
broadly of a brush in imposing injunctive relief.    
The only allegation set forth in the FTC’s Complaint and therefore, defended 
by Abika.com, dealt with phone call activity records.  The FTC based its allegation 
that the practice was unfair on the confidential nature of Section 222 of the 
Telecommunications Act. (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 20-21).  There were no other 
allegations or other categories of business practices set forth in the Complaint or 
argued before the District Court.  The District Court made no rulings regarding any 
other business practice other than the practice of offering searches for phone call 
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activity records. (Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Aplt. App. at 
1383-1404; Order and Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1605-1618).  Despite this fact, the 
District Court imposed an injunction order which was far broader in scope than the 
issues litigated in this case.  This flies in the face of 5th Amendment due process.  
In the case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. the Supreme Court noted that 
injunctions must “restrain only unlawful conduct.” 458 U.S. 886, 924 n. 67 (1982).  
“Injunctions must be narrowly tailored and should prohibit only unlawful conduct.  
An ‘order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case.’” 
CPC Intern., Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 461, (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968)). 
The Court’s injunction governs all consumer information. (Order and 
Judgment, Aplt. App. at 1606-1608).  However, the FTC did not present any 
evidence and the District Court did not make any findings regarding any other 
consumer information or how distribution of that information met the elements of 
an unfair trade practice.  Accordingly, the District Court cannot legally enjoin 
activities which it has not found to violate any law.   
The District Court apparently utilized the FTC’s argument that the Court 
could “fence in” Abika.com.  A district court’s limited authority to “fence in” is 
discussed in the Tenth Circuit case of Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975).  
The Thiret case deals with a cease and desist order issued by the FTC.  The 
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Commission found that Thiret had violated the unfair trade practice and the Truth-
in-Lending Act and accordingly entered a cease and desist order.  Ultimately, the 
reviewing Court stated that the Commission can “effectively close all roads to the 
prohibited goal” and found that the cease and desist orders must “have a 
‘reasonable relationship’ to both the unfair trade practices and the violations of the 
Truth-in-Lending Act.” Id. at 181 (emphasis added).  This holding states that the 
provisions in an order issued by the Commission must have a reasonable 
relationship to the unfair trade practice.  In this case, the only unfair trade practice 
the District Court found was the distribution of telephone call activity records. 
(Order on Cross-Motions for SJ, Aplt. App. at 1383-1404).  Therefore the 
prohibited goal is the distribution of phone records and any “fencing in” must be 
related to the distribution of telephone call activity records.  Fencing in allows the 
Commission, in a cease and desist order, to make sure that all manners by which a 
Defendant may undertake the unfair practice are blocked.  Fencing in does not 
allow the Court to enjoin activities it has not found to be unfair.   
As cited by the FTC, the 1969 case of Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., states that a “federal court has broad power to restrain acts which 
are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have 
been committed or whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be 
anticipated from the defendant’s conduct in the past.”  395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969) 
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(emphasis added).  Again, the District Court interpreted this language far too 
broadly and violates due process.  The Supreme Court limited the federal courts’ 
power to restrain acts only to those which are the same type or class as those the 
court has found violate law.  In the present case, only acts related to the 
distribution of telephone call activity records are the same type or class as the 
unfair trade practice.  The Court cannot legally restrain acts for which it has not 
received evidence, legal authority, or made a finding as to their lawfulness.  
Nonetheless, in prohibiting the distribution of all consumer personal information, 
the District Court has done just that.  The District Court’s Order violates 
Abika.com’s due process rights and should be overturned.     
First Amendment Violation 
Further, the District Court’s injunction prohibiting “purchasing, marketing, 
offering for sale, or selling, or causing another to purchase, market, offer for sale, 
or sell” all consumer information constitutes a prior restraint on speech and 
infringes on Abika.com’s First Amendment rights. (Order and Judgment, Aplt. 
App. at 1606-1608).  “The term prior restraint is used ‘to describe administrative 
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of 
the time that such communications are to occur.’  Temporary restraining orders and 
permanent injunctions - i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are 
classic examples of prior restraints.” Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) 
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(internal citations omitted).  Prior restraints of expression bear a heavy 
presumption against constitutional validity. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 
713, 714 (1971).  “The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing 
justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’” Id.  In the case of Vance v. 
Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) the Supreme Court found that 
a nuisance statute was procedurally deficient because it authorize prior restraints 
that were more onerous than was permissible.  The Court noted that the statutes 
enjoined the showing of films which had not yet been determined to be obscene.  
In the same manner, the District Court’s injunction on all consumer information 
enjoins the distribution of information which was not determined to be unlawful.  
Thus, the District Court’s injunction constitutes a prior restraint on speech and 
violates Abika.com’s First Amendment rights.  Accordingly, Abika.com 
respectfully requests that this Court order that the District Court’s injunctive order 
be overturned.            
Equal Protection Violation 
 In addition to the First and Fifth Amendment violations contained in the 
injunction, the injunction also violates the equal protection provisions of the 
Constitution, as the FTC submitted incorrect evidence to the Court in support of its 
requested broad injunctive relief.  The FTC submitted an affidavit to the Court 
stating that compared to the other five entities that were sued for the same conduct, 
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Abika.com operated the largest scale information brokering business and stating 
that the other entities had either quit the business altogether or that the focus of the 
businesses had changed. (Thorleifson Affidavit, Aplt. App. at 1595-97).  This 
affidavit was incorrect and Abika.com provided evidence to the District Court that 
the other entities still had active websites, sites which claimed to do thousands of 
transactions. (Reply to Injunctive Brief, Aplt. App. at 1531-1589).  Nonetheless, 
the District Court did not strike the FTC’s affidavit and considered this improper 
evidence in determining whether or not and to what extent it should impose 
injunctive relief.  Ultimately, the District Court imposed broad injunctive relief 
based, at least in part, upon incorrect sworn statements from the FTC.       
IV. The information at issue was not legally protected confidential 
information, but rather, was protected commercial speech, the FTC had 
no jurisdiction to enforce information related to telecommunications, 
and as such the District Court erred in denying Abika.com’s Motion to 
Dismiss.   
 
A. Introduction 
 
The sole basis for the FTC’s assertion that Abika.com’s search listings for 
phone records was an unfair trade practice was based upon the incorrect premise 
that the records were confidential.  In support of this incorrect proposition, the FTC 
cited to Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. (Complaint, Aplt. 
App. at 20-21).  However, the statutory language of the Telecommunications Act 
makes clear that the act applies only to telecommunications carriers.  All other 
 58
Appellate Case: 08-8003     Document: 0101458324     Date Filed: 04/23/2008     Page: 67     
individuals and entities are not governed by the Act.  Because the Act does not 
apply to Abika.com, the FTC’s Complaint failed to state a cause of action for 
which the Court could grant relief.       
Furthermore, the FTC does not have authority to govern information related 
to telecommunications.  Congress gave that authority solely to the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”).  The fact that this authority lies solely 
with the FCC was made clear during Congress’ recent discussions prior to enacting 
the Telephone Records and Privacy Act.  (Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, 
Aplt. App. at 37-56). 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of an order denying a motion to dismiss is de novo.  
Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Med., LLC v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 
832, 837 (10th Cir. 2003).  This is the standard for a motion to dismiss brought 
under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker, 353 
F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004).   
C. Discussion 
The FTC’s Complaint alleges that Abika.com obtained “confidential” 
customer phone records. (Complaint, Aplt. App. at 20-21).  The FTC bases its 
assertion that the records are confidential on the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
which defines “customer proprietary network information” and then restricts the 
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manner in which telecommunications carriers can disclose this information. 47 
U.S.C. §222(h)(1) and (c)(1). (Id.).  Every substantive paragraph of the FTC’s 
Complaint relies upon a violation of the Telecommunications Act. (Aplt. App. at 
18-24).   It is only by improperly alleging that these records are “confidential” 
under the Telecommunications Act, that the FTC has any claim for an unfair trade 
practice.  However, it was not illegal for Abika.com to obtain this information, nor 
was it illegal for a non telecommunications carrier third-parties to disclose this 
information.   
Furthermore, in the criminal context, courts have made clear that individuals 
do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone records. Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979); U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-44 
(1976); State v. Gubitosi, 886 A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2005); State v. Johnson, 131 
P.3d 173, 184 (Or. 2006).  If individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in their phone records in the criminal context where courts afford individuals 
greater protections, certainly these same individuals do not have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy outside the criminal arena either.     
Lastly, during the time Abika.com offered search services for phone records, 
it was simply not illegal to obtain phone records, even through fraudulent means.2  
This is clear based upon the fact that it was not until mid 2006 that Congress 
                                                 
2 However, Abika.com did not itself obtain the phone records nor did it engage in any fraudulent means.  
This fact is admitted and conceded by the FTC.    
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enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Act, making it illegal to transfer phone 
records. (Motion to Dismiss, Aplt. App. at 37-56).  To underscore the fact that the 
actions alleged in the Complaint were not illegal, Senate Bill ESSB 6776 was 
passed on February 8, 2006, in an attempt to make the acts alleged in the 
Complaint illegal. (Motion to Dismiss, Aplt. App. at 37-38).  The House of 
Representatives proposed similar legislation in H.R. 4943.  (Motion to Dismiss, 
Aplt. App. at 39-47).  The House bill attempted to give authority to the FTC to 
enforce the “Prevention of Fraudulent Access to Phone Records Act.”  Ultimately, 
this bill was pulled. (Motion to Dismiss, Aplt. App. at 48-52).  The actions taken 
by the Senate and the House clearly demonstrate that there was no law preventing 
a third-party from collecting telephone records.3    As such, the FTC’s Complaint 
failed to state a cause of action and the District Court incorrectly denied 
Abika.com’s motion to dismiss.   
In addition, because it was lawful to obtain and distribute phone records, 
Abika.com’s actions were protected under the First Amendment.  As noted in 
Abika.com’s Motion to Dismiss, this Circuit previously held that the FCC’s 
regulations “restricting the use and disclosure of and access to customer 
proprietary network information” violated the First Amendment.  U.S. West v. 
FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999).  In the same manner, because 
                                                 
3 Additionally, as soon as it appeared that these activities may become illegal, Abika.com voluntarily 
stopped offering searches related to phone records.          
 
 61
Appellate Case: 08-8003     Document: 0101458324     Date Filed: 04/23/2008     Page: 70     
Abika.com’s activities were lawful, any restriction on its ability to provide phone 
record information was in violation of Abika.com’s protected commercial speech 
rights under the First Amendment.  “The First Amendment states, ‘Congress hall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’” Id. at 1231-32.   “It is well 
established that nonmisleading commercial speech regarding a lawful activity is a 
form of protected speech under the First, Amendment.” Id. at 1233.  In this case, it 
was undisputed that Abika.com was engaging in commercial speech and that the 
commercial speech was nonmisleading.  Abika.com charged an administrative fee 
for search services related to phone records and as such was engaged in a 
commercial activity.  (Aplt. App. at 145, 1246).  The information provided from 
phone record searches was non-misleading.  (Transcript of Hearing on SJ, Aplt. 
App. at 1702).  Therefore, Abika.com’s activities were protected commercial 
speech and the action taken by the FTC in charging Abika.com with an unfair trade 
practice and the District Court’s action in upholding that claim violated 
Abika.com’s First Amendment rights.     
The only action which the FTC alleged was an unfair trade practice was 
obtaining phone records.  However, the FTC does not have the authority to govern 
telephone records.  Congress gave that authority solely to the FCC.  As noted by 
the District Court, the FTC has conceded that only the FCC can enforce the 
Telecommunications Act. (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, Aplt. App. 
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at 95).  Accordingly, any action taken by the FTC in relation to the 
Telecommunications Act is done without authority.  Again, each substantive 
provision in the FTC’s Complaint was based upon a perceived violation of the 
Telecommunications Act.  As such, the FTC prosecuted its claim based upon a 
statute it had not authority to enforce.  The District Court erred in failing to dismiss 
the FTC’s Complaint on this basis.  Therefore, Abika.com respectfully requests 
that the court reverse the District Court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.   
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
 Abika.com requests that the Court set this matter for oral argument.  The 
issue of immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has 
been addressed by this Circuit in only a limited number of cases.  In the specific 
factual context of this case, the case will be one of first impression for this Circuit.  
Resolution of the issue will affect many individuals and companies who utilize the 
internet to provide services.   
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